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GAMBLING ON GOLDILOCKS:
ILLINOIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DAMAGE CAPS AND THE QUEST FOR
"JUST RIGHT" REFORM
KRISTEN ZAHARSKI*

I.

THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS

Cosmetic; Bariatric; LASIK; health care; crisis; reform. These
words pervade modern-day lexicon due to fundamental changes in
American mentality spanning the past few decades.' However,
individual attempts to eradicate personal insecurities via surgical
intervention are not without cost, the negative ramifications of
which are borne by both the patient and the nation.2 Furthermore,
* JD, The John Marshall Law School, 2012. The author would like to thank
past and present Law Review editors for their hard work and dedication. She

also wishes to thank Professors Rogelio Lasso and Marc Ginsberg for their
unwavering support, as well as Peter Sturm, MD, for his unparalleled ability
to recognize potential and inspire change. Perhaps most importantly, the
author would like to thank her family and friends for sticking by her through
it all.
1. See, e.g., Martin Donohoe, Women's Health in Context: Cosmetic Surgery
Past, Present, and Future: Plastic, Reconstructive, and Cosmetic Surgery, 11
2006),
28,
(Aug.
HEALTH 2
WOMEN'S
&
OB/GYN
MEDSCAPE
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/542448_2 (offering the statistic that
there were 10.2 million cosmetic procedures performed in the United States in
2005, which was an eleven percent increase from 2004 and a thirty-eight
percent increase from 2000), and Bariatric Surgery Statistics, BARIATRIC
SURGERY.INFO, http://www.bariatric-surgery.info/statistics.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012) (citing the statistic, according to the American Society for
Bariatric Surgery, that the number of gastric bypass surgeries performed in
the United States increased six hundred percent from 1993 to 2003), and
Susan Brady, Liposuction Hits Top Spot as Most Popular Plastic Surgery,
HEALTH NEWS, http://www.healthnews.comlen/news/Liposuction-Hits-TopSpot-as-Most-Popular-Plastic-

Surgery/20wbs5cPvEKPOb2AlFzQeP/%7BO%7D (last updated Aug. 9, 2010)
(quoting Alan Gold, MD, President of the American Society for Aesthetic
Plastic Surgery's concession that the twelve percent decline in overall demand
for cosmetic surgery in 2009 is related to the economy, not American
mentality). Dr. Gold stated, "[iut's clearly the economy, and people's concerns
about their future income, their time off from work to have a procedure, and
recovery from that." Id.
2. See generally Number of Laser Eye Surgery Procedures Performed,
http://www.laser-eye-surgerySTATISTICS,
SURGERY
EYE
LASER
(last
statistics.com/number-lasik-volume-number-of-lasik-surgeries.php
visited Mar. 22, 2012) (stating that, in the United States, twelve million
917
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advancements in medical technology ultimately lead to patient
misunderstandings regarding the fallibility of medicine. 3 This has
resulted in an increase in nonmeritorious medical malpractice
actions brought against health care personnel, namely hospitals
and physicians. 4 In response, malpractice liability insurers are
forced to raise premiums or even decline coverage, 5 which has
resulted in a health care "crisis."6 According to the American
Medical Association, Illinois maintains some of the highest
malpractice insurance premiums in the nation, and the
patients have undergone LASIK surgery since it was approved in 1995, but
that the number of individuals with unhappy outcomes is growing steadily,
drawing public attention), and Bruce Japsen, Malpractice Costs Top $55
Billion a Year in U.S., Harvard Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2010,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0909-notebook-health20100908,0,4495498.story (finding "the annual overall cost of medical liability
to be $55.6 billion, or 2.4 percent of total health care spending").
3. See, e.g., R. Morgan Griffin, Surgery Lite: Understanding Endoscopic
Surgery, WEBMD
(Aug.
12,
2008),
http://www.webmd.com/a-to-zguides/features/understanding-endoscopic-surgery (addressing the false "idea"
that people have that minimally invasive procedures are automatically
"better" than traditional surgery), and Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Liability
and the Culture of Technology, PROJECT ON MED. LIABILITY IN PA., 31, 58
(2004),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Report
s/Medicalliability/med mal_092204.pdf
(explaining
how
technological
advancements not only create unreasonable patient expectations but also
increase opportunities for error in diagnosis and treatment).
4. See Medical Liability Crisis Fact Sheet, Am. COLL. OF EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS,
http://www.acep.org/Legislation-and-Advocacy/PracticeManagement-Issues/Liability-Reform/Medical-Liability-Crisis-Fact-Sheet/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (according to a Harvard analysis, about forty
percent of the medical malpractice cases filed in the U.S. are without merit).
5. JEROME NATES, ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT DAMAGE AWARDS, 3A-18 MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (MB) § 18.15 (2010). See also Illinois Medical Malpractice
Insurance, COVERMD, http://www.covermd.com/medical-liability-insuranceIL.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (emphasizing that Illinois medical
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians are inextricably linked to the
expensive litigation system, and that although most medical malpractice cases
do not actually go to trial, it still costs physicians and their insurance
companies a significant amount of money and time to defend each claim). If
there is any doubt that caps do, in fact, have an effect on a physician's
insurance premium see Mike Colias, Illinois Med-Mal Ruling to Boost
Insurers' Costs 18%: Study, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Feb. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20100222/NEWSO3/200037194/illinoismed-mal-ruling-to-boost-insurers-costs-18-study
(computing an eighteen
percent increase in costs that Illinois medical malpractice insurers face as a
result of the invalidation of statutorily imposed damage awards caps in
Illinois).
6. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis' Recent
Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Jan. 21,
2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.20v1/DC1
("[b]oth rising premiums and a reduction in the number of firms offering
coverage characterize the most recent medical malpractice crisis").
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consequences are manifest statewide as physicians either stop
practicing or relocate7 to other states with less costly medical
liability coverage. 8
With the health care industry in an uproar, the Illinois
General Assembly (hereinafter "the General Assembly") has
responded to these concerns by attempting to cap damage 9 awards
arising from personal injury actions, specifically medical
malpractice. Consider the following scenarios in the context of caps

7. See, e.g., Karen Mellen, Hospital Laments Insurance Costs-ChristStaff
Flees
Malpractice
Rates,
CHI.
TRIB.,
May
4,
2004,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-05-04/news/0405040282_1
(reporting that
malpractice-insurance-insurance-premiums-insurance-rates
Advocate Christ Hospital officials said at a legislative hearing that the
hospital was losing vascular specialists, general surgeons, neurosurgeons, and
obstetricians due to more costly medical malpractice insurance), and Brief for
Ill. Hosp. Ass'n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 20, Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (No. 06 L 12109), 2008 WL
3857552 at *9 n.1 ("[alt least 42 doctors in St. Clair and Madison counties
have announced plans to leave, or have left, because of rising insurance rates"
(quoting Patrick J. Powers, Doctor Exodus Continues, BELLEVILLE NEWSDEMOCRAT (Nov. 9, 2003))).
8. Illinois Medical Malpractice Insurance, supra note 5. "According to the
Illinois Chamber of Commerce, a physician leaving Illinois to practice
elsewhere represents a $1.1 million annual economic loss, including the loss of
twelve office, hospital, and community jobs." Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (1979) defines damages as "a
sum of money awarded to a person injured by a tort of another." According to
Best v. Taylor Machine Works, economic damages are defined as "all damages
which are tangible, such as damages for past and future medical expenses,
loss of income or earnings and other property loss"; therefore, economic
damages can be objectively measured. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d
1057, 1067 (Ill. 1997) (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.2(a) (West 1996)).
Noneconomic damages are defined as "damages which are intangible,
including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering, disability,
disfigurement, loss of consortium, and loss of society." Id. (citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.2(b)). Furthermore, compensatory damages are defined
as "the sum of economic and non-economic damages." Id. (citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.2(c) (West 1996)). Due to the inherently subjective
nature of noneconomic damages, compensation of this type is difficult to
measure. Id. at 1110. Usually, damage award determinations are left to the
sound discretion of the jury and are only overruled if the awarded amount is
wholly unreasonable. Compare id. at 1079 ("[A] damages award will not be
subject to remittitur where it 'falls within the flexible range of conclusions
which can reasonably be supported by the facts' because the assessment of
damages is primarily an issue of fact for jury determination."), and Martinez
v. Elias, 922 N.E.2d 457, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (emphasizing that "[a] verdict
will not be set aside . . . unless it is so excessive that it indicates that the jury
was moved by passion or prejudice . . . or is so large that it shocks the judicial
conscience"), with Bussean v. Habco, Inc., No. 98 L 623, 2003 WL 24179471, at
*3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 23, 2003) (remitting a jury's damage award for future
medical related expenses because "although [damages] need not be proven
with mathematical precision there must be evidence that, such expenses are
reasonably certain to occur[,]" which was absent in this case).
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on damages: (1) While undergoing a routine operation, a patient is
administered medication to which she is allergic. Although the
drug allergy is well documented in her medical chart, this is
overlooked by medical personnel. As a result, the patient goes into
cardiac arrest, cannot be fully resuscitated, and lives the
remainder of her life in a largely vegetative state. 0 (2) A forklift
operator is suddenly engulfed in flames after the apparatus she is
driving malfunctions. She suffers from burns on over forty percent
of her body, including her face, torso, arms, and hands, and is
unable to continue working at the capacity to which she is
accustomed." (3) A patient seeks surgical intervention to remove a
malignant tumor. Due to postoperative complications, a
subsequent operation is performed shortly thereafter. The patient
later dies as a result of the stress of the second surgery. 12
This Comment will address the foregoing hypotheticals in the
context of past and present Illinois law, which has vacillated in its
application of damage award caps for more than a quarter of a
century. Despite the undeniable need for health care reform, the
Illinois Supreme Court (hereinafter "the court") has overturned
medical malpractice caps as violative of the Illinois Constitution
on three separate occasions, 13 citing principles concerning special
legislation, due process, and most recently, separation of powers.14
However, these decisions are not indicative of what is yet to come
because the General Assembly consistently amends its legislation
to combat constitutional deficiencies identified by the various
majorities of the court. 15 Furthermore, under the doctrine of stare
decisis, the court has no duty to declare new statutes invalid for
the same reasons unless the language of a subsequent statute is
substantially similar to that which was previously invalidated.' 6
This Comment will argue that despite the plethora of issues
surrounding medical malpractice damage caps in Illinois, the
health care crisis should lie at the core of this debate-not
separation of powers. Part II will provide the foundation for the

10. Loosely adopted from Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 81 A.D.3d 94
(N.Y.A.D. 1st Dept. Dec. 28, 2010).
11. See Best, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (addressing similar facts).
12. Loosely adopted from the facts of Robinson v. Boffa, 930 N.E.2d 1087
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
13. Although the court concedes that the legislative purpose of a statute is
relevant to a separation of powers analysis, the court refuses to consider the
underlying goal of the statute above its alleged constitutional inadequacies.
Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911-12.
14. See id. at 912 (stating that the primary issue before the court was
whether the statutorily mandated damage cap unduly invaded the province of
the judiciary).
15. Id. at 927 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (citing Arbino v. Johnson &
Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 429 (Ohio 2007)).
16. Id.
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aforementioned issues, including an overview of Illinois medical
malpractice caps from their inception. Part III will consider how
other states have responded to the medical malpractice crisis and
will also proffer an answer to whether the Illinois Supreme Court
has finally "gotten it right." Lastly, Part IV will address potential
resolutions to this tensional debate and will attempt to answer the
lingering question: Can there ever be medical malpractice caps on
noneconomic damages in Illinois?
II. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
A "cap" or "ceiling" is an absolute 7 limit on the damage
award recoverable and is established by statute. 8 Since 1975, the
Illinois legislature has passed three such statutes. The purpose of
these statutes is threefold: (1) "to decrease the frequency, severity
and cost of health care claims"; (2) to make malpractice insurance
reasonably affordable; and (3) to ensure prompt adjudication for
the most catastrophically injured individuals.' 9 However, the
constitutionality of these statutes is highly contested. Plaintiffs
contend that they are being unlawfully deprived of their rights to
access the courts, rights to a remedy, and rights to trial by jury. 20
The Illinois Supreme Court agrees.
When addressing the issue of damage caps, the court is
presented with a clear dichotomy between constitutional law and
common sense. Although it is well established that a constitutional
analysis is superfluous if it is not required to enter a final
judgment, 21 the court continues to unnecessarily assess damage
caps from a constitutional perspective. 22 Furthermore, the
constitutional argument so heavily relied upon by the court is
flawed. 23 Even if a constitutional analysis is necessary to
17. "The limitation applies irrespective of whether the court or jury
otherwise would have found a larger amount to be appropriate under the facts
of the particular case." Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1066.
18. STATUTORY CAPS ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARDS, 1-3 DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 3.06 (2010), available at LEXIS.
19. NATES, supra note 5.
20. STATUTORY CAPS ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARDS, supra note 18.
Plaintiffs also argue that damage caps are fundamentally unfair because these
statutes discriminate between slightly and severely injured plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1075, and Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1976) (arguing that capping damage awards
unreasonably discriminates against the most catastrophically injured victims
because plaintiffs who suffer only minor injuries are unlikely to meet the
monetary ceiling and therefore are not affected).
21. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 922 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (citing People v.
Waid, 851 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (Ill. 2006)).
22. In Lebron, judgment may have been entered absent a constitutional
analysis; the defendants could have ultimately prevailed on the merits, or the
jury's award could have been less than the statutory cap. Id.
23. See generally Hans A. von Spakovsky, A Case Study in Judicial
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determine these cases, damage caps can be defended with the
same argument from which they are attacked-separation of
powers. 24 Thus, when deciding damage cap constitutionality, the
court should focus its attention on improving the current state of
the health care system. In the last thirty-five years, however, the
Illinois Supreme Court has been confronted with the abovementioned dichotomy on three separate occasions. Each time the
court has approached the issue from a constitutional perspective,
and each time caps have failed.
A. A History of Medical Malpractice Caps in Illinois
The state's first attempt at riding the national wave of tort
reform came in 1975, when the General Assembly responded to the
emerging 25 medical malpractice crisis by passing Public Act 7996026 (hereinafter "the Act"). Specifically, section four of the Act
limited the maximum amount of compensatory damages
recoverable by plaintiffs to $500,000 for injuries suffered as a
result of medical negligence. 27 However, the Act was short-lived
and was invalidated by Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital
Association in 1976.28 The court dismissed the defendants'
argument that the cap represented "a reasonable response to a
problem confronting the vast majority of the people of the State of
Illinois[,]"29 and held that the Act was arbitrary, thereby
Nullification: Medical Malpractice Reform in Illinois, 52 THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION,
Apr.
29,
2010,
at
3-4,
http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm-52.pdf (arguing that "[t]he
separation of powers analysis is completely flawed because it fails to
acknowledge the legislature's constitutional power to make, amend, alter, or
abolish the tort laws of the state-including both the procedural and
substantive law applying to malpractice claims against medical providers").
'This authority includes the power not only to change prior laws enacted by
the legislature, but also to change judge-made law itself." Id.
24. See Lebron 930 N.E.2d at 920-21 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (stating that
while the majority opinion purports to defend separation of powers principles,
it is the judiciary who is unduly invading the province of the legislature, not
vice versa).
25. Thorpe, supra note 6. "By many accounts, the United States is in the
midst of its third 'crisis' in medical malpractice. The medical malpractice
'crises' in the mid-1970s and 1980s occurred during times of rapid growth in
insurance premiums. In the 1970s rising claims frequency and severity
resulted in the exit of many malpractice carriers." Id. (citing R. Bovbjerg,
Comment, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
PreliminaryReport Card,22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1989)).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. 1975, ch. 70, 1 101, effective Nov. 11, 1975.
27. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1975, ch. 70, 101).
The Act did not apply to "any other cases." Id. at 738.
28. See generally id. (invalidating the Act on constitutional grounds of
special legislation).
29. Id. at 739. Amici curiae, Illinois State Medical Society and Protective
Medical Association of Illinois, filed a brief in support of this contention. Id.
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constituting special legislation. 30
Nearly twenty years after Wright, the Illinois legislature
enacted Public Act 89-7, commonly referred to as the Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995.31 Pursuant to Section 2-1115.1 of
this Act (hereinafter "Section 2-1115.1"), noneconomic damages
were limited to $500,000 in a variety of tort actions, including,
inter alia, actions seeking damages on account of "death, bodily
injury, or physical damage to property based on negligence, or
product liability . . . ."32 Furthermore, Section 2-1115.1 explicitly
provided that it did not intend to create a "right" to recovery of
noneconomic damages,33 but was rather proposed to stabilize
damage awards. 34
Similar to the defendants in Wright, the defendants in Best v.
Taylor Machine Works argued that Section 2-1115.1 was a valid
reform measure, which was within the scope of the General
Assembly's power to change and enforce the common law.35
However, the court disagreed and struck down damage caps for a
The section headed "Interest of the Amici Curiae: The Health Care Crisis"

described the "rapid and disproportionate rise in malpractice claims and high
dollar awards and settlements." Id.
30. Id. at 743. "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or
can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 13.
31. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1995).
32. Id. 5/2-1115.1(a).
33. Id. 5/2-1115.1(d).
34. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1067. In an effort to not make the same mistake
twice, the Illinois legislature was careful to document the key role of the
statutory cap, which is reflected in the preamble to 2-1115.1. Id. The preamble
outlines eighteen specific "findings" in addition to eight listed "purposes"
based on those findings, which are presumed to illustrate legislative intent. Id.
Some of the findings declare that:
(1) limiting noneconomic damages will improve health care in rural
Illinois, (2) more than 20 states limit noneconomic damages, (3) the cost
of health care has decreased in those states, (4) noneconomic losses
have no monetary dimension, and no objective criteria or jurisprudence
exists for assessing or reviewing noneconomic damage awards, (5) such
awards are highly erratic and depend on subjective preferences of the
trier of fact, [and] (6) highly erratic noneconomic damages awards
subvert the credibility of such awards and undercut the deterrent
function of tort law[.]
Id. Furthermore, the following are some of the proffered purposes of section 21115.1: (1) "reduce the cost of health care and increase accessibility to health
care"; (2) "promote consistency in awards"; (3) "reestablish the credibility of
the civil justice system"; (4) "establish parameters or guidelines for
noneconomic damages"; (5) "protect the economic health of the state by
decreasing systemic costs"; and (6) "ensure the affordability of insurance." Id.
35. Compare id. at 1063, with Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741. The defendants
also contended that the statute had serious policy implications, and that its
enforcement was necessary to regulate the state's economic health. Best, 689
N.E.2d at 1063.
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second time. Although the court cited some of the same
constitutional provisions at issue in Wright,36 it also invalidated
Section 2-1115.1 on the grounds that it violated separation of
powers.37 Specifically, while the court in Best acknowledged that
the practice of ordering a remittitur of excessive damages has been
historically recognized and accepted as part of Illinois law as a
largely judicial function,3 8 the court ultimately concluded that
Section 2-1115.1 constituted a "legislative remittitur[,]" which
invaded the deliberative process of the jury.3 9 Therefore, the limits
on noneconomic damages as set forth in Best were again struck
down as violative of the Illinois Constitution.40
B. The CurrentState of Medical MalpracticeCaps in Illinois

In 2010, the Illinois legislature once again tried its hand at
capping medical malpractice damages. 41 On its face, Section 101(4)
of Public Act 94-677, commonly referred to as the Healing Art
Malpractice Act of 2010,42 looked promising. Pursuant to Section

36. Compare id. at 1068, with Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 744. The court further
explained that the statute constituted special legislation because it eliminated
fairness and impartiality in the awarding of noneconomic damages, which
benefited defendants by allowing them to "escape" liability for a portion of
compensatory damages, while simultaneously prevented plaintiffs from
recovering limitless awards. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1076-81. The court
determined that the appropriate standard by which special legislation should
be reviewed was the rational basis test. Id. at 1071. Accordingly, the court
needed to determine whether Section 2-1115.1 was "rationally related to a
legitimate State interest[,]" which the court concluded it was not. Id. at 1071,
1081. Here, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court when the
lower court vehemently opined that there was "no conceivable argument [that
could] be made in good faith to suggest that arbitrarily limiting
[compensatory] damages complies with the [Illinois Constitution]." Id. at 1068.
37. Id. at 1080. "The legislative, executive and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." ILL.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
38. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1079.
39. Id. at 1080.
40. Id. at 1081.
41. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Blagojevich Announces
Major Reduction in Medical Malpractice Insurance Rates in Illinois (Oct. 13,
2006),
available
at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPress
Release.cfm?SubjectlD=1&RecNum=5414.
After
signing
the
medical
malpractice reform legislation, Illinois Governor, Rod Blagojevich, announced
a "major reduction in medical malpractice insurance rates." Id. The Governor
expounded:
I signed the medical malpractice reform law to keep doctors in our state
and make health care more accessible and more affordable. Just one
year later, we are seeing dramatic results. New competition in the
malpractice insurance market is resulting in lower premium rates, and
it's making Illinois a state where doctors want to practice.

Id.
42. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2010).
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2-1706.5, noneconomic damages awarded in medical malpractice
actions were capped at $1,000,000 for claims against hospitals
and/or its personnel 43 and were capped at $500,000 for claims
against physicians.44 However, on February 4, 2010, the court in

Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital held medical malpractice
caps unconstitutional for a third time. 45 As in Best, the court
reasoned that the statute violated separation of powers,46 and
dismissed the defendants' argument contending that the statutory
cap constituted a valid exercise of the Illinois General Assembly's
police power to respond to a public threat.4 7 Although the court in
Lebron conceded that the legislative purpose 48 or goal of a statute
is not irrelevant to a separation of powers analysis, the court noted
that it is not the primary consideration in adjudicating the matter
either. 49
Interestingly, the Lebron decision drew perhaps the most
vehement dissent of all three cases. Among the dissent's criticisms
is that the court "rush[ed] to address the constitutionality of Public
Act 94-677; that [the court] only 'purport[s]' to defend the
constitution; and that [the court] stand[s] as an 'obstacle'50 to the

43. Id. 5/2-1706.5(a)(1).
44. Id. 5/2-1706.5(a)(2). Note that the $500,000 damage limitation applies
not only to physicians individually, but also the physician's business or
corporate entity and medical personnel or other health care professionals. Id.
45. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d 895. The American Medical Association and Illinois
State Medical Society jointly filed an amicus curiae brief supporting
defendants. Brief of Am. Med. Ass'n & Illinois State Med. Soc'y, Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Lebron, 930 N.E.2d 895 (No. 06 L 12109), 2008
WL 7890609. When the court ruled, the Illinois Medical Society said, "it
was a huge blow, because the law expanded patient access to care and
helped curb frivolous lawsuits." Fighting to Protect Tort Reform Laws,
2010),
http://www.amaNEWS
(Mar.
1,
AMERICAN
MEDICAL
The AMA said that the
assn.org/amednews/2010/03/01/edsaO3Ol.htm.
decision "threatened to undo everything that patients and doctors in
Illinois got under the cap, including increased competition among medical
liability insurers, lower medical liability premium rates and greater
access to care." Id.
46. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
47. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 903.
48. Id. at 911. In Lebron, the Attorney General, acting as an amicus for
defendants, opined that section 2-1706.5 constituted an equitable means of
ensuring that all who stand to benefit from a resolution of the health care
crisis also contribute to its resolution. Id. at 909.
49. See id. at 912 (stating that the crux of the court's separation of powers
analysis "is whether the statute unduly infringes upon the inherent power of
the judiciary," and that regardless of whether the statutory language intended
that infringement is irrelevant).
50. The Amici on behalf of defendants agreed, stating, "Legislatures must
be free to make judgments balancing competing interests to serve [the] public
good." Brief for Ill. Hosp. Ass'n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants,
supra note 7, at *6. The Amici also noted that nothing in the Illinois
Constitution states that the ability of plaintiffs to recover noneconomic

The John MarshallLaw Review

926

[45:917

legislature's efforts to find an answer to the health-care crisis,
'put[ting] at risk the welfare of the people."'5 1
Thus, the current state of Illinois law is that caps on
noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice actions are
unconstitutional. The future of Illinois law has yet to be
determined, however, because the statutes at issue in Wright,
Best, and Lebron, are highly distinguishable. Each time caps fail,
the Illinois legislature responds by amending the language of the
statute. It appears as though the General Assembly is applying
the age-old technique of trial and error, and may be inching closer
to getting the statutory language "just right."
III.

THE QUEST FOR "JUST RIGHT" REFORM

A. The Struggle with Statutory Language
As the court and the legislature continued to debate the idea
of damage cap constitutionality, it was clear that the General
Assembly was making strides. By the time of the Lebron decision
in 2010, considerable attempts had been made to adopt statutory
52
language that best served the interests of all parties involved.
damages supersedes the General Assembly's right "to address the serious and
growing impact of such recoveries on access to health care in Illinois." Id.
51. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 915. The Lebron dissent also referenced an
address by President Obama to a joint session of the United States Congress
in which the President expressed the following disapprobation:
Our collective failure to meet this challenge [of health care reform]year after year, decade after decade-has led us to the breaking
point. . . . Our deficit will grow. More families will go bankrupt. More
businesses will close. More Americans will lose their coverage when
they are sick and need it the most. And more will die as a result. We
know these things to be true.
Id. at 917 (Karmeier, J., dissenting); Press Release, The White House,
Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-presssoffice/Remarks-by-the2009),
9,
President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care.
To that point,
former President George W. Bush also addressed the medical liability crisis,
specifically in Illinois, in January 2005. President Bush stated:
Many of the costs that we're talking about don't start in an examining
room or an operating room. They start in a courtroom. What's
happening ... is that lawyers are filing baseless suits against hospitals
and doctors. That's just a plain fact. And they're doing it for a simple
reason. They know the medical liability system is tilted in their favor.
Jury awards ... have skyrocketed in recent years. That means every
claim filed by a personal injury lawyer brings the chance of a huge
payoff .... Juries hand out big awards that drive up insurance rates
and doctors are forced to move or close their practice.
Illinois Medical Malpractice Insurance, supra note 5; Edward J. Kionka,
Article, Things to Do (or Not) To Address the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2006).
52. According to the dissent in Lebron, the Illinois legislature has "wide
regulatory power" in matters pertaining to health care as well as discretion "to
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For example, the Illinois legislature presumably recognized that
the statute invalidated by Wright, albeit narrow in scope, had far
too broad an effect. Pursuant to the Act, in actions arising from
medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, both
noneconomic and economic damages were capped at $500,000.53
Although the Act applied exclusively to actions arising from
medical negligence, it ultimately limited not only a plaintiffs
recovery of noneconomic losses but also tangible damages. 54
Therefore, in cases concerning the most catastrophically injured,
the Act may have prevented full recovery of a plaintiffs clearly
ascertainable medical expenses.5 5
Consider again the first hypothetical involving the patient
with a drug allergy.56 This scenario would have triggered the Act
because the plaintiffs cause of action arises from medical
negligence. Assuming that the plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case for medical negligence, in this instance application of the
Act may have resulted in a grave injustice-the plaintiff may not
have been able to recover the cost of the care and treatment she
received, which would not have been required but for the
defendants' negligence. Thus, the court was correct in its holding
in Wright-the Act had too broad an effect.

The Illinois legislature presumably intended to ameliorate the
extensive reach of the Act when it promulgated Section 2-1115.1
nearly twenty years later. Contrary to the Act, Section 2-1115.1
capped noneconomic damage awards only; however, the statute
was no longer limited to claims arising solely from medical
negligence.5 7 Instead, the scope of Section 2-1115.1 regulated a
myriad of tort actions such as wrongful death, property conversion,
and products liability.58 Thus, the scope and effect accomplished by
determine not only what the public interest and welfare require, but to
determine the measures needed to secure such interest." Lebron, 930 N.E.2d
at 919-20 (Karmeier, J., dissenting) (citing Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
759 N.E.2d 533, 546 (Ill. 2001) (quoting Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v.
Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ill. 1985))).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. 1975, ch. 70, 101.
54. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 746 (explaining that a stronger argument
favoring caps would exist if the statute permitted unrestrictive recovery of
economic damages, including expenses for treatment and care for seriously
and permanently injured persons).
55. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1110 (citing Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d
560, 564 (1979)) (warning against the broad reading of the statutory provision
at issue in Wright). See also Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742 (explaining that
because of the statutory language, a plaintiff might be unable to recover all of
the tangible medical expenses she might incur, in which case she would
recover nothing for any other loss suffered).
56. See supra Part I (suggesting a potential cause of action for medical
liability).
57. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1995).
58. Id.
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Section 2-1115.1 was diametrically opposed to those that emerged
under the Act. The Illinois legislature had gone too far. Although
the effect of Section 2-1115.1 was successfully narrowed to cap
only noneconomic damage awards, the scope of the statute became
too broad.
The second hypothetical regarding the badly burned
employee59 is best understood in the context of Section 2-1115.1.
Here, the plaintiffs claim arises from a products liability action,
yet despite seriously debilitating and disfiguring injuries, the
plaintiff would be subject to a noneconomic damage cap under
Section 2-1115.1. Considering that one of the policy concerns
driving statutory codification of noneconomic damage awards is
the underlying health care crisis in Illinois and greater United
States, there is certainly a less compelling reason to uphold award
limitations in cases that do not implicate the future of the health
care system. Therefore, the court was once again correct when it
invalidated Section 2-1115.1 in Best.
Subsequent to Best, the General Assembly drafted Section 21706.5 anticipating that it may finally be just right. Section 21706.5 reverted its statutory language to reflect that used in the
Act, which narrowed the scope of Section 2-1706.5 to causes of
action arising exclusively from medical malpractice, rather than
personal injury actions in general.60 In addition, Section 2-1706.5
also reflected the narrow effect exhibited in Section 2-1115.1 in
that it capped only noneconomic damage awards. 61 What is more,
the legislature was exceedingly cerebral in its decision to bifurcate
the monetary cap applied to noneconomic damages according to
the defendants to the litigation. For the first time in Illinois
history, Section 2-1706.5 dictated that noneconomic damages be
capped at $1 million for causes of action arising from medical
malpractice against a hospital and/or its personnel, and $500,000
for similar causes of action against physicians. 62
In the third hypothetical, liability is less clear compared to
the former two scenarios. Here, the patient was receiving
treatment necessary to combat a terminal diagnosis.63 This
hypothetical illustrates the application of Section 2-1706.5. In this
case, the plaintiffs claim arises from a medical malpractice action
and the statute indicates that only noneconomic damages will be
subject to the cap. Absent gross negligence on the part of the
operating physician, the question remains as to whether the
59. See supra Part I (suggesting a potential cause of action for general tort
liability).
60. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2010).

61. Id.
62. Id.

63. See supra Part I (suggesting a potential cause of action for medical
liability where possible damages are less certain).
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plaintiffs noneconomic loss should be compensated in excess of the
statutory maximum. This is especially significant when these
noneconomic damage awards, in the aggregate, are likely to result
in further detriment to the remainder of state and national health
care systems. A decision, as in Lebron, to invalidate damage caps
of this nature also unearths issues concerning Americans'
distorted perceptions regarding the infallibility of the practice of
medicine, and pressures experienced by physicians to implement
defensive medicine strategies. 64 Therefore, the court's decision to
invalidate noneconomic damage caps as set forth in Section 21706.5 is unsupported by the facts driving the current health care
crisis. It was not until the most recent decision in Lebron that the
Illinois Supreme Court seemingly got it wrong.

B. Follow the Leader?
Interestingly, in his majority opinion in Lebron, Chief Justice
Fitzgerald raucously rejected the defendants' contention asserting
that the noneconomic damage caps then effectuated in Illinois
paralleled similar provisions currently upheld in several other
states.65 The Chief Justice went on to say, "[t]hat 'everybody is
64. "Defensive medicine" refers to a type of medical practice in which
physicians and other health care personnel order or perform more tests than
medically necessary in order to reduce exposure to lawsuits. RICHARD E.
SHANDELL & PATRICIA SMITH (updated by Fredrick A. Schulman), THE
PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 2.02(1) (Law
Journal Press 2009). As multimillion-dollar jury awards have become more
commonplace in recent years, problems concerning defensive medicine have
reached crisis proportions. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE
QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS By FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 1

(July 24, 2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf. Defensive
medicine practices contribute to the health care crisis by increasing health
insurance premiums. SHANDELL & SMITH, supra. In his speech to the AMA in
June 2009, even President Obama was compelled to address the overwhelming
consensus among physicians that defensive medicine practices protect them
from future lawsuits. Peter Orszag, Malpractice Methodology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/opinion/21orszag.html.
According to a 2002 survey, a staggering seventy-six percent of physicians are
concerned that malpractice litigation has hurt their ability to provide quality
care to patients. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra, at 4. Due to
the fear of litigation, seventy-nine percent of physicians surveyed said that
they ordered more tests than were medically necessary, and ninety-one
percent noticed their colleagues doing the same. Id. Moreover, seventy-four
percent unnecessarily referred patients to outside specialists, fifty-one percent
recommended unwarranted invasive procedures to confirm diagnoses, and
forty-one percent said that they prescribed more medications, such as
antibiotics, than required. Id. at 5.
65. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2010) (capping
noneconomic damages at $250,000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2010)
(adjusting $250,000 cap annually based on average wages); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1903 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic damages at $250,000); MD. CODE
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doing it' is hardly a litmus test for the constitutionality of the
statute."66 Yet, this statement flies in the face of the "laboratories
of democracy" argument widely recognized by courts today.67
Although this argument may be insufficient to survive a
constitutional analysis,6 8 if it is considered in light of underlying
state concerns regarding the health care crisis, rather than from a
strictly constitutional perspective, it may prove to hold some
weight. 69
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic damages
at $500,000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 2010) (capping
noneconomic damages at $500,000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 2010)
(capping noneconomic damage awards at $350,000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9411 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic damages at $250,000); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 32-42-02 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic damages at
$500,000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic
damages at $500,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West 2010) (capping
noneconomic damage awards at $450,000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (West
2010) (capping noneconomic damages at $500,000, which was subsequently
increased to $1 million in 2003); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 893.55 and 895.04 (West
2010) (capping noneconomic damages at $350,000, which is indexed for
inflation). In addition, some states cap the total amount of damages awarded,
opposed to just noneconomic damages. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West
2010) (limiting defendants' liability to $250,000 per practitioner per incident
and limiting total damages being paid from patient compensation funds to
$1,250,000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 2010) (limiting total
damage cap to $500,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and future medical
expenses); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2010) (enforcing caps on total damages
that range from $500,000 to $1.75 million depending on when the cause of
action accrued); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West 2010) (capping total
damage awards at $2.05 million for 2012).
66. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 914. Interestingly, this is the exact argument
that the Alabama Supreme Court made when it held noneconomic damage
caps to be unconstitutional in that state. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592
So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991). The court proffered evidence that its disposition of
the case was "facilitated by reference" to case law that had previously "evolved
from constitutional challenges brought in the highest courts of other states to
statutes imposing damages 'caps' of various types." Id. The court went on to
state that it appeared that "the majority of courts reviewing challenges under
the constitutions of their respective states have invalidated limitations on
damages." Id.
67. For example, in a 1992 class action lawsuit involving toxic chemical
exposure, the Texas Supreme Court eloquently explained, "[j]ust as other
states may rely on unique Texas law developed independently by the
legislature and judiciary of this state, this court has a growing responsibility
as one of fifty laboratories of democracy to assist the federal courts in shaping
the fundamental constitutional fabric of our country." Davenport v. Garcia,
834 S.W.2d 4, 18 (Tex. 1992) (emphasis added).
68. Chief Justice Fitzgerald emphasized that compensatory damage caps
enforced by other states are highly variable, both in the maximum amount of
noneconomic damages recoverable and statutory specifics. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d
at 913. He went on to state that it is not for the court to pontificate whether
other states' legislation is ultimately reasonable or not. Id. at 914.
69. For example, in the twenty-five years subsequent to California's
implementation of medical malpractice damage caps in 1972, California's
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For example, Florida courts have consistently held that the
state statute capping noneconomic damages arising from medical
malpractice actions is valid. 70 This statute is exceedingly specific
and contains numerous caveats affecting a plaintiffs recovery.7 1
Read as a whole, these qualifications evidence the Florida
legislature's attempt to encourage tort reform, not prejudice
vulnerable plaintiffs. 72 In 2009, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida considered for the first time a
plaintiffs contention that the statute violated the Florida
Constitution. 73 Although the court engaged in a detailed
malpractice insurance premiums rose less than any other state in the nation167 percent compared to 505 percent! The Medical Liability Crisis and Its
Impact on Patient Care: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator from the State
of Utah).
70. FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2010).
71. According to the Florida statute, noneconomic damage awards are
capped at $500,000 against practitioners and $750,000 against nonpractitioners. Id. The statute defines practitioners as both licensed health care
personnel and associations, corporations, firms, partnerships or other business
entities that employ medical practitioners. Id. Furthermore, it increases
noneconomic damage caps to $1 million against practitioners and $1.5 million
for non-practitioners in wrongful death actions or when the patient is left in a
permanently vegetative state as a result of medical malpractice. Id. In the
event that the plaintiffs claim neither arises from a wrongful death action nor
renders the patient in a vegetative state, the Florida statute still leaves to the
courts' discretion the potential to increase caps to $1 million or $1.5 million,
respectively, in cases of the most catastrophically injured plaintiffs or where
"manifest injustice" would result based on the severity of the plaintiffs
noneconomic harm. Id. The statute defines "catastrophic injury" as a
permanent impairment such as spinal cord injuries resulting in paralysis,
amputations that render the affected appendage inoperable, severe brain or
closed-head injuries which result in sensory, motor, communication, or other
cerebral disturbances or neurological disorders, second- or third-degree burns
of twenty-five percent or more of one's total body surface or third-degree burns
of five percent or more to one's face and hands, complete loss of vision, or loss
of reproductive ability. Id. Concerning "manifest injustice," the statute
considers the special circumstances of the case and whether the noneconomic
harm suffered by the injured party was particularly severe. Id. Moreover, the
Florida statute also caps noneconomic damage awards correlated with injuries
sustained during the administration of emergency medical care (i.e. services
that are rendered in the time period before the patient is stabilized and
capable of receiving nonemergency care). Id. Lastly, the Florida statute also
specifies the amount of noneconomic damages that may be awarded in binding
arbitration. Id.
72. According to a 2007 statistic, Florida's malpractice insurance premiums
were among the highest in the nation, surpassing California, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois. Colin Gray, The Medical Liability Crisis, 2 UNIV.
OF KY. GATTON COLL. OF Bus. & ECON. STUDENT RESEARCH PUBL'N 1, 5
(2010), http://gatton.uky.edu/GSRPIDownloads/Issues/Spring2OlO/The%2OMed
ical%20Liability%20Crisis.pdf.
73. Estate of McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2009). No Florida Supreme Court or appellate court decision had yet

932

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:917

constitutional analysis, it declined to apply the textual approach
used by the Illinois Supreme Court in Wright, Best, and Lebron.
Rather, the Florida court incorporated common sense into its
constitutional analysis and considered the underlying health care
crisis.7 4 Not surprisingly, the court concluded that noneconomic
76
damage caps in medical malpractice actions were valid.
In this seminal case, the plaintiffs, who were the
representatives of the deceased claimant, argued, among other
things, that damage caps infringed upon the claimant's
constitutional right to fair compensation,76 equal protection,77 and
separation of powers.78 The Florida court rejected the plaintiffs'
fair compensation argument after undertaking a common-sense
reading of the constitutional right claimed.79 The court also
rejected the equal protection argument on the grounds that,
despite its disparate effect, the statute differentiated claims on the
basis of each malpractice incident, which ultimately served a
rational and legitimate governmental purpose.8 0 Finally, the court
briefly dismissed the plaintiffs' separation of powers argument
since the statute was not outcome determinative.8 1
Similar to Florida's legislation, Oklahoma's legislation
capping damage awards in medical malpractice actions also
includes conditions for which caps may or may not apply. For
example, Oklahoma caps noneconomic damages at $250,000 for all
medical malpractice actions arising from both obstetric and
emergency care services, but the cap does not apply to wrongful
death actions. 82 In addition, the legislation provides that the
addressed these questions. Id. at 1297.
74. Id. at 1298.
75. See generally id. (upholding noneconomic damage cap awards).
76. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 26. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that since
this provision stipulates that they can receive specified percentages of all
damages awarded to them, any cap on potential damage awards is
unconstitutional. McCall, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
78. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
79. McCall, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. The court reasoned that the plain and
ordinary meaning of the right as written and intended by the framers did not
conclusively define what damages were, in fact, recoverable. Id. The court
declined to follow a previous trial court decision that struck damage caps on
constitutional grounds since the trial court did not consider the constitutional
provision in its entirety. Id. (citing Cavanaugh v. Cardiology Assoc. of
Orlando, P.A., No. 06-CA-3814, 2007 WL 5844414 (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. Oct. 30,
2007)).
80. Id. at 1303-04. The court reasoned that Section 766.118 was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable because its rational and legitimate purpose was to
enhance the predictability of excessive noneconomic damage awards, thereby
increasing the affordability and availability of medical liability insurance
among health care professionals. Id. at 1304.
81. Id. at 1306-07.
82. H.R. 1774, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011). This legislation
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noneconomic damage cap may be lifted if the action arises from
either of the abovementioned health care services where the judge
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
committed the alleged negligence. 83 This is similar to the South
Carolina statute, which does not apply damage caps in cases
84
where the defendant is found to be grossly negligent.
Interestingly, since its initial enactment in 2003, the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's legislation has not yet been
challenged.
Unfortunately, not all states have been able to evade
constitutional evaluation of noneconomic damage caps by the
courts. Illinois is just one of many states that have passed damage
award limitations in medical malpractice actions and since
declared them unconstitutional. 85 Similar to the Illinois Supreme
Court, the highest courts of these states have reasoned that
noneconomic damage awards violate state constitutional
provisions concerning equal protection, due process, separation of
powers, and right to trial by jury.86 However, this approach is
rather myopic considering underlying concerns regarding the
health care crisis and statistical data suggesting that capping
damage awards does, in fact, lower malpractice insurance
premiums as well as reduce average malpractice costs per
7
patient.8
It has yet to be determined whether the statutory caps at

amends the cap from $300,000 to $250,000 in obstetric and emergency care
services. In all other medical negligence actions the cap on noneconomic
damages is set at $300,000.
83. Id. The statute's use of the clear and convincing evidence language
raises the standard of proof from the traditional preponderance of the evidence
standard, thereby making it more difficult to raise the damage cap. VICKI
LAWRENCE MACDOUGALL, 8 OKLA. PRACTICE SERIES § 12:16 (8th ed. 2012).
84. S.C. STAT. § 15-32-220(E) (2011).
85. ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (1993), invalidated by Moore, 592 So.2d 156; GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), invalidated by Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C.
v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d
(1986), invalidated by Brannigan v. Usitalo, 134 N.H. 50 (N.H. 1991); and
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 4590i, §§ 11.02 and 11.03 (West 2010),
invalidated by Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
86. Moore, 592 So.2d at 164, 170 (arguing right to trial by jury and equal
protection); Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220 (arguing right to a jury trial,
separation of powers, and equal protection); Brannigan, 134 N.H. at 52
(arguing equal protection, due process, and the right to trial by jury); and
Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691 (arguing that the noneconomic damage caps were
unreasonable and arbitrary considering constitutional protections).
87. Charles R. Ellington et al., State Tort Reforms and Hospital Malpractice
Costs, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 130 (2010). The average malpractice
premium in states with no malpractice damage caps was $4158, compared to
$3186 in those states with some form of cap. Id. Further, the average
malpractice cost per patient was $5868 in states without malpractice damage
caps versus only $4558 in those states enforcing caps. Id.
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work in Florida, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and those states
adopting similar provisions will conclusively reduce health care
premiums and increase the overall quality of patient care. Since
caps such as these apply only in limited circumstances, the
statutory language may prove to be too specific and narrow to
render significant results. However, it is now within the purview
of the Illinois legislature to once again modify the Illinois statute
concerning medical malpractice damage caps.
IV. THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS IN
ILLINOIS - FACT OR FICTION?

Although it may be some time before the Illinois General
Assembly drafts the statutory language "just right," it is certain
never to achieve this goal if the Illinois Supreme Court continues
to analyze this issue from a purely constitutional perspective.88 In
addition, the statutory language should be redrafted to reflect
differing legal standards of ordinary negligence and willful and
wanton conduct. This would help to distinguish undesirable
medical outcomes from bona fide negligence claims, thereby
capping noneconomic damage awards where liability is less clear.
Lastly, the legislature should specify circumstances in which these
caps may not apply. This would better serve the interests of the
most catastrophically injured plaintiffs while simultaneously
protecting medical practitioners from frivolous lawsuits89 and
outrageous damage awards.90
88. Proponents of noneconomic damage caps, such as State Senator Dave
Luechefeld, have recently proposed a constitutional amendment (Senate Joint
Resolution Constitutional Amendment 103) that would afford the necessary
protection for any future malpractice laws passed by the Illinois legislature. S.
103, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010). The proposed amendment
would add a new section to Article 4 of the Illinois Constitution, which would
assist the legislature in preventing future judicial decisions from overturning
noneconomic damage caps passed by the majority of the general assembly. Id.
89. Medical Liability Crisis Fact Sheet, supra note 4. Of the lawsuits
analyzed, many lacked evidence that a medical error was even committed, yet
the costs incurred to defend these suits averaged approximately $60,000. Id.
Moreover, the individual practitioners named in these lawsuits were forced to
take time off from work in order to defend themselves at trials and other legal
proceedings, the majority of which were dismissed with no payouts to the
plaintiff. Id.
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 64, at 9-10
(stating that the number of mega-verdicts has been steadily increasing). As
expected, the most outrageous verdict awards have occurred in those states
that do not have limitations on noneconomic damage awards arising from
medical malpractice actions. Id. For example, in 2002 a Mississippi jury
rendered a verdict of $100,000,000. Id. Similarly, the largest personal injury
verdict in the state of Illinois, $127,000,000, also arose from a medical
malpractice action. Verdicts & Settlements, GOLDBERG & GOLDBERG,
http://www.chicagomedicalmalpracticefirm.com/lawyer-attorney-1410036.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
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JudicialInterpretation

As the late United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter
suggested, the law should be read with "the saving grace of
common sense."9 ' As an avid proponent of judicial restraint,
Justice Frankfurter opposed constitutional interpretation that
impeded the powers of the legislative and executive branches. 92
Here, the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the opposite
approach, interpreting the statute only in ways that silence the
voice of the legislature98 and allow common sense to fall by the
wayside. If the court were to take a different approach, medical
malpractice damage caps could potentially survive.
Common sense lends itself directly to the consideration of
larger issues concerning the medical liability crisis,94 its effect on
physician availability within the state,9 5 and the overall cost and
quality of treatment rendered.96 These considerations, no doubt,
satisfy the reasonable basis standard set forth in Best,97 and
91. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
92. See generally JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE 169 (Gary J.
Jacobsohn et al. eds., 1996) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's notion of passive
jurisprudence, wherein he advocated against judicial intrusion into the
legislative and executive branches).
93. But see ILL. CONST. art. II, §1 (stating that no branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another).
94. See Thorpe, supra note 6 (discussing the most recent medical
malpractice crisis). See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra
note 64, at 1 (same); Medical Liability Crisis Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (same);
Gray, supra note 72, at 2 (same); and Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 746 (citing
Marcus Plant, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis",20 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES,
UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCHOOL 2, 13) (suggesting that the consistent increase in
multimillion-dollar jury awards has led medical liability issues to attain crisis
proportions).
95. See Mellen and Powers, supra note 7 (reporting a decrease in physician
availability due to rising insurance rates, which cause physicians to flee the
state of Illinois).
96. See Illinois Medical Malpractice Insurance,supra note 5 (discussing the
economic loss of losing Illinois physicians to other states where medical
liability premiums are not as high). See also sources cited supra note 64
(suggesting that the overall quality of medical care has declined due to
defensive medicine practices) and Lindsey Tanner, 9 in 10 Docs Blame
28,
2010),
(June
Lawsuit Fears For Overtesting, MSNBC.COM
http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/37982567/ (discussing how defensive medicine
is estimated to cost the U.S. billions of dollars each year) and Medical
Liability Crisis Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (reporting that many on-call
physicians no longer care for emergency patients or refuse to perform highrisk procedures due to their perpetual fear of litigation).
97. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1069. The Best court stated that legislative
classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group (i.e. hospitals and
physicians) are prohibited unless there is a reasonable basis for the difference
in treatment. Id. at 1070. However, the dissent argued that noneconomic
damage caps were reasonably related to individuals' interests in compensation
for their injuries and the public's interest in reducing the costs of the tort
system. Id. at 1108 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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provide reasons why noneconomic damage caps should be
upheld.98 If the court continues to analyze this issue from a purely
constitutional perspective, medical malpractice damage caps will
not survive, and the health care crisis in Illinois will continue to be
exacerbated. If, however, the court decides that the health care
crisis is worthy of legislative intervention and caps are upheld as
constitutional, then perhaps Illinois physicians could reduce
spending and improve the quality of patient care for all.

B. Legal Standards
Ordinary negligence claims arise when the standard of
reasonable care has been breached, whereas willful and wanton
actions arise from conscious, voluntary acts or omissions in
reckless disregard of the consequences affecting the life or
property of another. 99 Because intent is not a necessary element to
establish a cause of action for ordinary negligence, many health
care providers are sued under this theory of liability. However,
future legislation regarding noneconomic damage cap awards in
medical malpractice actions should be drafted to reflect differences
between ordinary and gross negligence. It is necessary to
distinguish this difference because not only do medical errors
occur, they are inevitable. 10 0
Thus, it should follow that plaintiffs' claims can be exempt
from the statutory damage cap only if they demonstrate gross
negligence in their treatments. This would likely reduce the
number of lawsuits filed under the guise of negligence that are
brought by disgruntled plaintiffs dissatisfied with treatment
outcomes. Furthermore, potential plaintiffs would not suffer grave
injustices as a result of this legislative modification because they
would still recover-their recovery would be limited only if the
98. Although a Constitutional amendment has recently been proposed, this
may not be necessary. See S. 103, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010)
(explaining that the amendment is designed to prevent the Illinois judiciary
from overturning noneconomic damage caps successfully passed by the
legislature). If the Court simply applied common sense opposed to
emphasizing the separation of powers argument as set forth in Lebron, then it
would be able to interpret the statute as being rationally related to its
legislative purpose. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911. The legislative purpose or goal
of a statute is relevant even in a separation of powers analysis. Id.
99. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 287 (5th
ed. 2005).

100. Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical
Fallibility, 1 J. MED. AND PHILOSOPHY 51, 51 (1976). Due to a patient's

undeniable fear of physician error, patients generally tend to deny that the
medical practice is fallible. Id. This has resulted in an incessant conflict
between medicine and the law regarding the extent to which medical error is
avoidable, when it is culpable, and what relationship it should bear to
compensation for harm. Id.
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damages sought exceeded the ultimate cap and either (1) the
alleged conduct was not willful or wanton; or (2) the plaintiff did
not fall within any other exceptions outlined in the statute.
C.

Circumstancesthat Necessitate Exceptions

If upheld, there are unique circumstances in which
noneconomic damage caps should and should not be enforceable.
There are some instances in which plaintiffs should be able to
recover damages in excess of the statutory maximum due to the
nature and extent of their injuries. Conversely, the medical
profession itself naturally gives rise to a variety of situations
where noneconomic damages should be mandatorily capped,
consistent with the statute. These exceptions would serve to strike
a balance for recoverable damages between potential plaintiffs and
defendants.
Concerning plaintiffs, the statutory language should be
rewritten to exempt from medical malpractice damage caps cases
that result in the most severe permanent physical impairments.
For example, in wrongful death actions or cases where the
treatment rendered results in catastrophic injury,10 ' caps should
not apply provided it can be proven that the injury suffered is
causally related to medical negligence. Although Florida has
implemented a similar provision, note that the Florida statute
provides for countless exceptions that result not in the cap being
entirely lifted, but merely increased. Illinois should provide for
fewer exceptions than Florida, but where these exceptions are met,
Illinois should lift the cap entirely. Therefore, the statute would
truly cater to the most catastrophically injured plaintiffs.
Although not all catastrophic injuries are tangible, it would
not be prudent for Illinois to adopt a "manifest injustice" provision
similar to that set forth in Florida's legislation. 102 This is because
the "manifest injustice" standard is inherently subjective and
would only further complicate an already overly complex
problem.103 Furthermore, too many exceptions may ultimately
undermine the statute's constitutionality.
Regarding defendants, noneconomic damage caps should be
101. Similar to the Florida statute, the statutory language should define
"catastrophic injury" as those injuries resulting in quadriplegia, paraplegia,
certain types of disfigurement, or where the patient is left in a permanently
vegetative state or is otherwise largely incapacitated. FLA. STAT. § 766.118
(2010).
102. Id. The Florida statute leaves to the courts' discretion the potential to
increase caps in cases where a "manifest injustice" would result based on the
severity of the plaintiffs noneconomic harm. Id.
103. Theoretically, this provision would not resist the effects of the health
care crisis because practically all plaintiffs' attorneys could argue that the
noneconomic harm suffered by their clients was particularly severe, thereby
resulting in a "manifest injustice." Id.
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mandatorily enforced when the injury is correlated to emergency
medical care. 104 In addition, caps should apply to all causes of
action arising from unnecessary medical treatment, such as
cosmetic surgery, provided the conduct was not willful or wanton.
There must be some accommodation for the fallibility of
medicine.10 5
V. CONCLUSION
The brunt of the health care crisis is borne by all Illinois
citizens alike, regardless of whether one favors or opposes tort
reform legislation. The statutes at issue in Wright, Best, and
Lebron were not intended to discriminate against the most
catastrophically injured plaintiffs. Rather, noneconomic damage
awards have been capped in medical malpractice actions in an
effort to reduce medical liability premiums and improve the
quality of medical care for all. 106 In light of this legitimate purpose,
the Illinois Supreme Court should cease to consider future
statutory modifications from a purely constitutional perspective.
Should the court fail to do so, noneconomic damage caps will
continue to be invalidated in this state. Although the quest for
"just right" reform has proved to be very difficult, it will not get
any easier going forward. Here's hoping that when the General
Assembly finally does get it right, the court will recognize these
efforts and respond accordingly.

104. This reflects the view that a lower degree of care is applicable in
emergency situations. Dobbs & Hayden, supra note 99, at 385.
105. Gorovitz & MacIntyre, supra note 100, at 51.
106. See sources cited supra note 96.

